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The polio outbreak in China in 2011 makes it necessary to revise the 2010 polio
National Action Plan (NAP) in Korea. The revised plan was provided after eval-
uation of the 2010 NAP, literature reviews, and expert advice. It was discussed
and confirmed by the Polio National Certificate Committee (NCC).
The revised NAP (2012 NAP) has structured the action to take by patient phase
and the role of each institution. It also provides the specified classification and
management actions on the contacts. It includes a new recommendation of one-
time additional immunization for the contacts regardless of the immunization
history. The 2012 NAP could provide an effective countermeasure if there are
imported poliomyelitis patients in Korea.1. Introduction
In 2010, polio outbreaks occurred in countries in
Central Asia that had had no previous outbreaks (e.g.,
Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and the Russian Republic) [1].
Korea has no report of patients infected with wild
poliovirus since 1984 [2], but the possibility of outbreak
due to imported cases has prompted establishment of the
National Action Plan (NAP) for response to poliomy-
elitis importation [3]. Since then, there was an outbreakted under the terms of the C
0) which permits unrestrict
roperly cited.
ase Control and Preventionin the province in China which borders Pakistan in 2011
[4]. Concerns about imported poliomyelitis and the
response plan in Korea has led to the 2010 NAP being
reconsidered. As a result, more concrete and systematic
contents are necessary to enhance the 2010 NAP.
The revision of the 2010 NAP with consideration of
foreign cases was arranged and discussed by the Polio
National Certificate Committee (NCC). This paper aims
to introduce the NAP revision process with this
background.reative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License (http://
ed non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
. Published by Elsevier Korea LLC. All rights reserved.
118 Y.-J. Park, et al2. Process of the Revision of the NAP
The 2010 NAP cannot be evaluated and revised based
on performance with real patients, therefore we have
selected the items for revision through literature
reviews, field health workers comments, and experts’
advice. In this revision we aim to provide specific
guidelines to each agency and agent for systematic
responses on a case-by-case basis in the event of an
epidemic in Korea. The revision was discussed and
confirmed by the first polio NCC.3. Results
3.1. 2010 NAP evaluation
The 2010 NAP is composed of five category:
surveillance, investigation, risk assessment, outbreak
response, and evaluation/documentation. Outbreak
response, the key domain, is divided and described into
six subgroups and includes the work sheet to charac-
terize the patient’s epidemiology and trace the
contacts.
The 2010 NAP includes a basic principle for
management of infectious disease epidemics and theTable 1. 2010 National Action Plan key contents and result of
Category Key contents
1. Reporting suspected case NIDS, AFP surveillance system
2. Case investigation Within 24 h of case reported
Identify source of infection,
*Include work sheet
3. Expert meetings Advisory board, review agenda, r
4. Outbreak response
(i) Case isolation Confirmed, suspected case isolati
Isolation duration
Contact precaution
(ii) Management of
potential contacts
Contact classification (household,
Quarantine duration
Immunization
(iii) Immunization Case contact immunization
(iv) Cleaning and
disinfection
Disinfect the toilet and materials
the case during his/her infectio
Stool management of the case du
isolation
(v) Enhanced surveillance Laboratory surveillance fortified
all virus laboratories
Enhanced period: at least 6 mo a
(vi) Risk communication Basic principle
*Sample notification letter includ
5. Lessons learned and
revision of the plan
Revise national action plan
AFP Z acute flaccid paralysis; HCW Z health care workers; NAP Z Nationlaboratory diagnosis, duration of isolation, classification
of the contacts, and immunization proposed on
a medical basis. Furthermore, it includes the advisory
committee’s review and risk of communication to
consider the impact one patient might make when there
has been no case in Korea since 1984.
However, management and surveillance could be
fortified by patient phase but it is not suggested because
we do not have a specific standard between suspected
and confirmed patients. Also, the level of management
of the contacts should change by intensity of contact.
We intended to minimize possible overreactions in cases
of low transmission. Outbreak response should be
simultaneous and comprehensive by related agencies,
and it is necessary to provide comprehensive reactions
by agency countermeasures for prompt and systematic
responses (Table 1).3.2. Major revision
3.2.1. Countermeasures by patient phase
Polio case is a significant matter in public health and
society, so that an active rapid containment strategy in
the early stage is necessary, but over-countermeasures in
the low transmission stage should be minimized. In thisevaluation
Result of evaluation
Adequate
Adequate
ole Need to change advisory board
on Need to specify the classification criteria
for suspected cases and confirmed
cases. Need to classify roles of
agencies by case stage (suspected or
confirmed)
HCW, public) Need to provide the contact
classification and management.
Need to recommend immunization by
case stage
used by
us period
ring
for
fter the last case
Need to fortify surveillance area by case
stage
es documentation
Adequate
al Action Plan; NIDS Z National infectious disease surveillance.
Revision of polio NAP in Korea 119regard, patients are classified into suspected and
confirmed cases and major countermeasures are struc-
tured in the key components of response, patient
management, contact management, and surveillance
fortification.
The suspected cases are treated under isolation
while the stool test is being examined. The contacts
are vaccinated and undergo hygiene education and the
area is placed under intensive surveillance. If the
suspected case is identified as a confirmed case, then
he/she should undergo the isolated treatment and the
stool test every week for loss of infectivity. The
contacts are isolated, tests are taken for confirmation
with additional vaccination, and the intensive
surveillance area is expanded to the whole nation
(Table 2).3.2.2. Role of agency
If a case is reported, the major response agencies are
classified into treatment, field response, centralTable 2. Case classification definition and major activities of
classificationcoordination, and expert committee. The necessary
countermeasures are determined by patient phase.
Significant matters in the public health perspective
require the expert committee’s approval (Table 3).3.2.3. Criteria of classification and management of
the contacts
The situation and intensity to contact a patient varies.
The 2010 NAP only classified contacts on a general
level (”household”, “healthcare workers (HCW)”,
”public”), with no consideration of other situations and
the intensity of contact.
In the revised 2012 NAP, ”toilet contact” was added,
which considers those who shared the same toilet with
the patient in the infectious period. Among HCW
contacts, the person who contacts the patient with
personal protective equipment belongs to public contact.
Due to the high possibility of importation, passengers in
the same airplane or ship are included in the contact
classification.case/contacts management, surveillance according to case
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120 Y.-J. Park, et alIntensity of contact occurs in the descending
order of: household contact, toilet contact, HCW
contact, and pubic contact. The highest risk contacts
(household contacts) are quarantine in the home and
perform confirmation tests and immunization. The
next highest risk contacts (toilet contact and HCW
contact) are to take a confirmation test and immu-
nization without quarantine. Finally, those who have
had public contact receive immunization only
(Table 4).3.2.4. Immunization
According to the 2010 NAP, contacts with
a complete polio immunization history do not need to
have additional immunization. Although literature
review does not provide evidence of immunization
being able to prevent disease after exposure to
poliovirus [5], it has been reported that one-time
polio vaccination for the immunized person boosts
the immunization reaction and reduces the virus
discharge from the intestine and pharynx of infected
people [6]. Furthermore, in Australia, one time
immunization was given to the contact regardless of
past history when an imported polio case occurred in
2007 based on this report [7]. The 2012 NAP added
one IPV (Inactivated Polio Vaccine) immunization to
all contacts of the suspected case. If a person was
vaccinated less than 1 month previously, he/she is
exempt from one-time immunization, because the
minimum immunization interval for the polio vaccine
is 1 month. In the confirmed stage, the contacts
should be given the necessary additional immuniza-
tion (Table 5).4. Discussion
Korea has not witnessed a patient infected with
poliovirus since 1984, so it might be thought that
poliomyelitis is an eliminated disease in Korea, but as
in China [4] and Australia [6], it is a feasible scenario to
have an incidence caused by an imported case and for
this to turn out to be an outbreak.
Hence the Korea Centers Disease Control and
Prevention made an NAP for imported polio in 2010,
which was revised and systemized in 2012. The revised
2012 NAP has classified the suspect cases and
confirmed cases, provides roles and countermeasures by
agencies, and has provided specific classification and
management items for contacts, so that the field
workers can easily utilize the guidelines.
In the future, to enhance the ability of the field
workers with these guidelines, we will continue to
provide on-the-job education to them, and conduct
research into polio immunity to provide evidence,
which in turn may necessitate another revision.
Table 4. Contacts classification, quarantine, and management protocol
Contacts classification Definition Quarantine and management
Household Family of the case
Persons living with the case and sharing the toilet
(for dormitory and inmates)
Quarantine at home
Quarantine period: until there have been two
consecutive negative stool culturesc
Serology test: prior to immunization
Immunization
Toilet People sharing the toilet with the case during his/her
infectious periodb
No quarantine
Stool culturec : until there are two consecutive
negative stool cultures
Immunization
HCWa Medical staff in contact with the case during the
infectious period
Laboratory workers handling the specimens of the
case
No quarantine
Stool culturec : until there are two consecutive
negative stool cultures
Immunization
Public Co-workers of the case (school, company, etc.)
Passengers on the same aircraft, ship and trains
Hospital contacts other than medical staff during the
infectious period
Primary responder
No quarantine
Immunization
aWhen coming into contact with the case in the infectious period without protective equipment, and if the case is isolated and HCWs contact him/her with
protective equipment, it is classified as ‘public contact’; bInfectious period: from 11 days prior to the onset of symptom up to 6 weeks later; cCollect the stool
within 3 days after contact, with an interval of 24e48 h. HCW Z health care worker.
Table 5. Recommendation of polio immunization by case classification
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